The Church’s Messages to the Supreme Court

 

An amicus brief is a document submitted to courts by groups or people who have some interest in the outcome of the case. For landmark Supreme Court cases a lot of professional organizations, for example, will take a position and outline their reasons. My understanding is that the justices and their clerks don’t actually have to read these, but if it’s a brief from a person or organization that is important I assume they do, and occasionally the judge will cite an amicus brief in their decision-making.

I went through the Supreme Court docket and identified all the recent cases where the Church submitted an official amicus brief as an interested party in some precedent-setting, landmark case before the Supreme Court. I then used AI to summarize it. So if you want to see the Church’s official position on, say, people not baking cakes for same-sex couples for religious reasons, it’s all there.

As seen, the Church’s messaging to the Supreme Court (unsurprisingly) deals with religious liberties issues; matter of fact, it appears they have had something to say about virtually every major religious liberty case that has come before the Supreme Court. The Church appears to be helping build safeguards around religious liberty issues even if they do not immediately affect its operations. On one hand the Church tends to officially stay out of fights it doesn’t need to be involved in. For example, it doesn’t have the extensive hospital system that the Catholics and Seventh-day Adventists do, with all the tricky implications of that, and it appears to heave withdrawn from the adoption game, so it is not immediately facing the same issues as, for example, Catholic social services. Still, it is clear from its amicus brief activity that even though the Church has largely withdrawn from sectors where religious liberties issues are currently at play before the Supreme Court, they are not indifferent to the outcomes of such jurisprudence.

303 Creative LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Aubrey Elenis, et al.

This document is a brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, supported by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, and other religious groups. The case involves a challenge to Colorado’s anti-discrimination laws, specifically how they apply to a web designer, Lorie Smith, who objects to creating websites for same-sex weddings due to her religious beliefs.

Key Points:

  1. Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights: The brief argues that recognizing LGBT rights should not come at the expense of religious freedom. It references Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage, and emphasizes that the ruling explicitly protects the rights of religious individuals and organizations to maintain their beliefs about traditional marriage without facing punishment or coercion.
  2. First Amendment Protections: The brief highlights that the First Amendment offers “double coverage” for religious speech, both as a matter of free exercise of religion and free speech. It claims that Colorado’s law compels Lorie Smith to express messages she disagrees with, violating her First Amendment rights.
  3. Compelled Speech and Religious Beliefs: The brief contends that forcing Smith to create websites that promote same-sex marriage infringes on her freedom of speech and religion. It argues that religious speech about marriage should be protected and that Colorado’s public accommodations law should not force individuals to express views that contradict their faith.
  4. Historical and Legal Context: The brief draws on historical precedents and legal cases to support its argument that religious speech should receive strong protections, even in the context of public accommodations laws.
  5. Pluralism and Tolerance: It argues for a pluralistic approach where both LGBT rights and religious freedoms are respected. The brief suggests that allowing individuals like Smith to refuse services based on religious beliefs does not deprive LGBT individuals of access to services, as they can obtain them elsewhere.

The brief calls on the Court to reverse the lower court’s decision, arguing that applying Colorado’s law in this way violates the First Amendment.

Gerald E. Groff, Petitioner v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General

The document is an amicus brief submitted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in the case Gerald E. Groff v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (No. 22-174). The case addresses the issue of religious accommodation in the workplace, specifically the standard for when employers must provide accommodations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Key Points:

  1. Argument for Overruling Hardison: The brief argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison (1977) wrongly interpreted Title VII by establishing that employers could deny religious accommodations if they imposed more than a “de minimis cost” on the business. The amici argue that this interpretation undermines religious freedom, as it sets too low a bar for employers to refuse accommodations.
  2. Alignment with the ADA: The brief suggests adopting the “undue hardship” standard used in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which defines undue hardship as “significant difficulty or expense.” They propose that this standard should apply in religious accommodation cases as well, making it harder for employers to deny accommodations.
  3. Negative Impact of Hardison: The brief contends that the Hardison decision has led to significant harm, especially for religious minorities and economically disadvantaged workers. The current standard allows employers to refuse reasonable accommodations for religious practices, such as observing a Sabbath, based on minor costs or inconveniences.
  4. Impact on Employees: The amici highlight that religious accommodation claims disproportionately affect religious minorities, including Seventh-day Adventists, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are often denied accommodations because their practices differ from those of the majority. They argue that Hardison makes it too easy for employers to dismiss religious needs, which burdens religious employees.
  5. Request for Overruling and Legal Clarification: The amici urge the Court to overrule Hardison and clarify that under Title VII, employers must accommodate religious practices unless doing so would cause significant difficulty or expense to the business, not just inconvenience to coworkers.

This brief emphasizes the importance of restoring stronger legal protections for employees seeking religious accommodations in the workplace.

David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al., Petitioners v. A. Pender Makin

This document is an amicus curiae brief submitted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in support of the petitioners, David and Amy Carson, in the case Carson v. Makin. The case concerns Maine’s tuition aid program, which excludes students attending religious schools from receiving state aid.

Key Points:

  1. First Amendment Violation: The brief argues that Maine’s exclusion of religious schools from its tuition aid program violates the First Amendment’s protection of free exercise of religion. By denying aid to students who wish to attend schools with religious instruction, the state discriminates against religion.
  2. Religious Discrimination: The brief advocates for a per se rule against religious discrimination, citing past Supreme Court cases where the Court ruled against laws that targeted religious beliefs or practices. It argues that Maine’s law discriminates based on religious use of tuition funds, which is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
  3. Historical and Legal Context: The amici curiae emphasize that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were designed to protect religious freedom and prevent religious discrimination. They draw parallels between Maine’s law and historical practices that imposed civil disabilities on religious minorities.
  4. Free Exercise vs. Establishment Clause: The brief stresses that the Establishment Clause should not be interpreted as justifying Maine’s exclusion of religious schools. Rather, the Free Exercise Clause requires that religious schools be treated equally when it comes to public benefits like tuition assistance.
  5. Request for Reversal: The amici urge the Supreme Court to reverse the lower court’s decision, arguing that Maine’s law stigmatizes religious students and families, denying them equal access to state benefits solely because of their religious choices.

In summary, the brief argues that Maine’s exclusion of religious schools from its tuition aid program constitutes unconstitutional religious discrimination and urges the Supreme Court to strike it down.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, et al., Petitioners v. Shirin Emami, Acting Superintendent, New York Department of Financial Services, et al.

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in the case Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Linda A. Lacewell. This case challenges a New York regulation that mandates employers, including religious organizations, to provide health insurance covering medically necessary abortions. The brief argues that this requirement violates religious autonomy as protected by the First Amendment.

Key Points:

  1. Violation of Religious Autonomy: The brief argues that the New York abortion mandate infringes on the religious autonomy of organizations like the petitioners by forcing them to fund and facilitate actions—specifically, abortions—that go against their deeply held religious beliefs. This mandate is seen as a direct violation of the First Amendment, which guarantees that religious organizations can govern their own affairs free from state interference.
  2. Limited Religious Exemption: While New York provides a narrow exemption for certain religious employers, the brief contends that this exemption is overly restrictive and still requires religious institutions to engage in activities they find morally objectionable. It also critiques the state’s process for determining which employers qualify for the exemption, which involves excessive government entanglement in religious matters.
  3. Excessive Entanglement: The brief highlights that the exemption process invites “excessive entanglement” between the government and religious organizations, which is prohibited under the Establishment Clause. Religious employers are required to reapply annually for the exemption, subjecting their religious beliefs and practices to ongoing state scrutiny.
  4. Contradiction with Supreme Court Precedents: The brief argues that New York’s abortion mandate is not justified by Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion rights. The state’s mandate is seen as a policy choice rather than a legal necessity, and the brief stresses that the Constitution does not require states to subsidize or promote abortions.
  5. Religious Liberty in Danger: The amici curiae emphasize the broader implications of the case for religious liberty. They warn that allowing New York’s regulation to stand could lead to further encroachments on religious autonomy, not just in New York but in other states as well, where similar mandates might arise.

In summary, the brief urges the Court to review and reverse the lower court’s decision, arguing that New York’s abortion mandate is an unconstitutional infringement on religious freedom and autonomy.

Sharonell Fulton, et al., Petitioners v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court in support of the petitioners in the case Sharonell Fulton, et al. v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The case involves Catholic Social Services (CSS), a foster care agency that was excluded by the City of Philadelphia from its foster care program because it refused, due to religious beliefs, to certify same-sex couples as foster parents.

Key Points:

  1. Overruling Employment Division v. Smith: The brief argues that the Smith decision (1990), which allowed the government to enforce neutral, generally applicable laws even when they burden religious practices, has caused significant harm to religious freedom. It advocates for overruling Smith, proposing that courts should instead use a strict scrutiny standard for Free Exercise claims.
  2. Unworkability of Smith Standard: The amici argue that Smith has proven unworkable, resulting in confusion and inconsistent rulings across the federal circuits. The case has led to serious infringements on religious freedom, as it allows the government to deny religious exemptions even when such exemptions could be reasonably accommodated.
  3. Two-Part Free Exercise Framework: The brief advocates for a two-part framework for Free Exercise claims. First, certain government actions should be categorically barred, such as religious targeting. Second, in cases where categorical rules do not apply, the government should be required to meet strict scrutiny, justifying any burden on religious exercise by proving a compelling state interest pursued in the least restrictive way.
  4. Religious Targeting by Philadelphia: The brief argues that the City of Philadelphia targeted CSS because of its religious beliefs, violating the Free Exercise Clause. It claims that the city excluded CSS solely because it would not certify same-sex couples as foster parents due to religious beliefs. This targeting, the brief asserts, is unconstitutional.
  5. Strict Scrutiny Should Apply: Even if the Court does not find religious targeting, the brief contends that Philadelphia’s actions cannot survive strict scrutiny. It argues that there are many other agencies available to certify same-sex couples, and Philadelphia could accommodate CSS’s religious beliefs without undermining the city’s interests in anti-discrimination.

The brief urges the Supreme Court to reverse the lower court’s decision, asserting that Philadelphia’s exclusion of CSS from the foster care system violates the Free Exercise Clause.

Our Lady of Guadalupe School, Petitioner v. Agnes Morrissey-Berru

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in the case Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel. The brief addresses the application of the “ministerial exception,” which protects religious institutions from government interference in employment decisions concerning employees performing important religious functions.

Key Points:

  1. Support for Religious Autonomy: The brief emphasizes that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses protect the right of religious organizations to decide who will serve in key religious roles without government interference. This protection is necessary to preserve religious organizations’ autonomy to govern themselves and fulfill their religious missions.
  2. Ministerial Exception and the First Amendment: The ministerial exception, as established in Hosanna-Tabor, prevents courts from adjudicating employment disputes involving ministers and other key religious functionaries. The amici argue that the exception should not be limited to employees with religious titles but should also include those whose duties are essential to the religious organization’s mission.
  3. Broader Application of the Ministerial Exception: The brief contends that the ministerial exception should apply to employees who perform critical religious functions, such as teaching religious doctrine, conducting worship services, or holding significant leadership roles. It argues that courts should avoid focusing too narrowly on religious titles or formal training and instead consider the importance of the employee’s duties in advancing the organization’s religious mission.
  4. Proposed Legal Standard: The amici propose a broad standard for the ministerial exception, applying it to any employee whose role is crucial to the religious mission of the organization, either through performing religious functions or holding positions of significant leadership or discretion.
  5. Conclusion: The brief urges the Court to adopt a standard that grants religious organizations wide latitude in determining which employees fall under the ministerial exception, emphasizing that this is essential to preserving their constitutional rights to free exercise and autonomy in internal governance.

The brief advocates for reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decisions, which had narrowly interpreted the ministerial exception.

Darrell Patterson, Petitioner v. Walgreen Co.

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in support of Darrell Patterson, the petitioner in Patterson v. Walgreens Co. This case involves the issue of religious accommodation in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Key Points:

  1. Religious Accommodation and Title VII: The brief argues that courts have not adequately protected employees’ rights to religious accommodation under Title VII. The law requires employers to accommodate religious practices unless doing so would cause an “undue hardship.” However, the current interpretation of “undue hardship” is too lenient on employers, often allowing them to avoid accommodations based on minimal inconvenience.
  2. The Problem with the Hardison Decision: The brief critiques the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, which set a low bar for what constitutes an “undue hardship.” This ruling has made it easier for employers to deny accommodations for religious practices, including observing Sabbaths or religious dress codes.
  3. Widespread Impact on Diverse Faiths: The amici emphasize that the issues raised in this case affect millions of religious Americans from various faith traditions, including Christians, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and others. Many faiths require specific religious observances, such as refraining from work on certain days, wearing specific clothing, or maintaining religious grooming standards.
  4. Legal Confusion: The brief highlights a lack of consistency across court decisions regarding what qualifies as a reasonable religious accommodation and what constitutes an undue hardship for employers. This legal confusion has resulted in religious workers being denied meaningful protections, forcing many to choose between their job and their faith.
  5. Request for Reconsideration: The brief urges the Supreme Court to grant review of the case and reconsider the Hardison standard. It argues for a more robust interpretation of religious accommodation rights under Title VII, ensuring that religious workers are not forced to compromise their beliefs in the workplace.

In summary, the amici curiae seek a ruling that strengthens legal protections for religious accommodations, arguing that the current legal framework fails to adequately safeguard religious freedom in the employment context.

Tree of Life Christian Schools, Petitioner v. City of Upper Arlington, Ohio

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in the case Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City of Upper Arlington, Ohio. The case concerns the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), specifically its “equal-terms” provision, which prohibits governments from treating religious institutions less favorably than secular ones in land use regulations.

Key Points:

  1. Religious Freedom and Assembly: The brief emphasizes that religious freedom includes the right to assemble for worship and other religious activities. The ability to secure land for religious purposes is critical for many faith communities, and restrictions on land use often impede this fundamental right.
  2. RLUIPA’s Equal-Terms Clause: RLUIPA’s equal-terms clause prohibits local governments from treating religious institutions less favorably than nonreligious ones in land use decisions. This protection is essential to prevent discrimination against religious groups in zoning and land use regulations.
  3. Circuit Confusion and Inconsistent Application: The brief argues that lower courts have applied inconsistent legal standards regarding RLUIPA’s equal-terms clause, leading to confusion and unequal treatment of religious institutions. Some courts require religious institutions to prove they are “similarly situated” to secular institutions in terms of zoning criteria, a requirement not found in RLUIPA’s text. This has made it difficult for religious groups to secure land for worship or religious education.
  4. Sixth Circuit’s Error: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Tree of Life Christian Schools’ claim by requiring the school to prove it was similarly situated to other nonreligious land uses under zoning criteria. The brief argues this interpretation is incorrect and contradicts RLUIPA’s clear language, which aims to prevent unequal treatment of religious institutions.
  5. Call for Supreme Court Review: The amici curiae urge the Supreme Court to grant review to clarify RLUIPA’s equal-terms clause and ensure it is applied as written, without adding extra requirements like proving similarity to secular land uses. They argue that without Supreme Court intervention, religious organizations will continue to face unjust obstacles in securing land for their religious activities.

In summary, the brief supports Tree of Life Christian Schools’ argument that the City of Upper Arlington’s zoning regulations discriminated against them in violation of RLUIPA, and it calls for the Supreme Court to rectify the inconsistent application of the law.

The Universal Church, Inc., Petitioner v. Calvin Toellner, et al.

The document is an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religious organizations in support of The Universal Church, Inc., in the case Universal Church, Inc. v. Calvin Toellner. The case addresses the Second Circuit’s decision regarding trademark protection under the Lanham Act, which deals with trademark registration and protection for religious organizations.

Key Points:

  1. Importance of Religious Trademarks: The brief emphasizes that for religious organizations, a name represents more than a commercial brand—it embodies the community’s religious identity, beliefs, and practices. Protecting the trademark of a religious organization’s name is essential for safeguarding its identity and preventing misuse or misrepresentation.
  2. Lanham Act Protections: Under the Lanham Act, religious organizations often register their names as trademarks to protect their identity. This law prevents unauthorized use of religious names, which could confuse the public and harm the religious community’s reputation.
  3. Errors in the Second Circuit’s Decision: The amici argue that the Second Circuit made significant errors in its ruling by:
    • Disregarding the Lanham Act’s requirement to evaluate trademarks based on “the primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public” and instead focusing on historical and isolated uses of the name “Universal Church.”
    • Violating the “anti-dissection rule,” which requires that trademarks be evaluated as a whole rather than analyzing individual words in isolation. The court incorrectly declared the name “Universal Church” generic by focusing on each word separately.
  4. Consequences for Religious Organizations: The decision poses a threat to religious institutions, many of which use common religious words (such as “church,” “God,” or “Christ”) in their names. If trademarks are analyzed by isolating these common words, many religious trademarks could be deemed generic, thereby stripping these organizations of legal protection.
  5. Request for Supreme Court Review: The brief calls on the Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit’s ruling to restore proper interpretation of the Lanham Act and protect religious organizations’ trademarks. It emphasizes that religious trademarks must be protected to preserve the integrity and identity of faith communities.

In summary, the brief supports The Universal Church, Inc., and requests the Supreme Court to ensure religious trademarks receive the appropriate legal protection under the Lanham Act, allowing religious organizations to protect their names and identities.

9 comments for “The Church’s Messages to the Supreme Court

  1. As a non-lawyer, it seems to me that either the Church is submitting inconsistent briefs to the court, or your AI is incorrectly summarizing at least one brief. Specifically, the summary of Groff characterizes the standard imposed by Hardison for denying workplace accommodations to be anything more than “de minimus cost”. The brief then suggests that an “undue hardship” standard be used instead. Then the summary of Patterson characterizes the Hardison standard as “undue hardship”, but claims that the standard is not being applied correctly.

    So if the AI is summarizing correctly, then it looks like the Church is in moving-the-goalposts mode such that whatever accommodation standard is in place will never be enough.

    Or the AI could simply be mischaracterizing the standard in one of those briefs (probably Patterson).

  2. @Good Reason: Figuring out when a case is resolved is actually more complicated than it seems, because the Supreme Court will sometimes remand the decisions to the lower courts, and sometimes it pops back up into the Supreme Court’s docket, etc., these things can drag on for quite some time before they are definitely “over,” but when I get a second I’ll put the year that the amicus brief was filed.

    @Last Lemming: I looked at the actual amicus brief for Patterson (https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-174/255928/20230301133237408_No.%2022-174tsacTheChurchOfJesusChristOfLatter-DaySaints.pdf), and it looks like the confusion hinges on the fact that in Patterson the Church is arguing for a more stringent interpretation of undue harship, specifically the interpretation used by the ADA act. (“The brief suggests adopting the ‘undue hardship’ standard **used in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),** )” And in Groff it’s also arguing that the Hardison standard for “undue hardship” is too low. So in both cases it’s not arguing that Hardison a separate standard than undue hardship, but rather that Hardison’s version of undue hardship is too lenient, and that they should adopt the ADA standard instead…. I think, I also am no lawyer and might be missing something.

  3. Last Lemming, here is a response to your question about what was going on in Patterson (2020) and Groff (2023).

    These two cases were about the legal requirement for employers to accommodate employees’ religious practices. This requirement was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

    Title VII says that employers must accommodate employees’ religious practices unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” That’s where the phrase “undue hardship” comes from.

    In TWA v. Hardison (1977), the Supreme Court interpreted what “undue hardship” means. In the language of the cases, the question in Hardison was this: what is the legal standard a court should apply when deciding whether accommodation would create “undue hardship” for an employer? The Hardison opinion included a line about “more than de minimis” cost to the employer, and “de minimis cost” became the standard in subsequent cases in the lower courts.

    In Patterson and Groff, the main issue was whether the “de minimis” standard had turned out to be too restrictive toward employees’ religious practices.

    The church’s amicus briefs in Patterson and Groff argued that the standard for determining “undue hardship” for the employer should be higher than the Hardison “de minimis” standard. The parties in both Patterson and Groff proposed alternative legal standards to replace the “de minimis” standard. The church’s discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act (in the Groff brief) is about one of these possible alternative standards.

    The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in Patterson. But in Groff, the Court did take up the issue. In Groff, the Court rejected the “de minimis” standard. The new rule from Groff requires an employer to accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless the accommodation “would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.”

    Now, what does “substantial increased costs” mean? That’s up to the lower courts to start figuring out. First, a court is looking at the facts of Groff to decide what “substantial increased costs” are in that context.

    P.S. The AI summaries are okay as far as they go. But if you want to understand what the briefs really say–and why they say it–you have to go quite a bit deeper than the summaries given here. Maybe if we asked AI to give the full context for these cases and to explain the church’s briefs in that context, AI could do it. I don’t know.

  4. Thanks for the clarifications. Just to be clear, the Church is not moving the goalposts.

    As for the AI, perhaps the request should be to summarize the briefs AND harmonize those that refer to the same precedents.

  5. Good idea Last Lemming and Loursat. In a future post I’ll feed in the PDFs and ask it to present the Church’s positions on religious liberty issues more holistically while making detailed references to the themes and cases discussed in the amicus briefs.

  6. “A New York federal judge on Thursday sanctioned lawyers who submitted a legal brief written by the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT, which included citations of non-existent court opinions and fake quotes.

    Judge P. Kevin Castel said that the attorneys, Peter LoDuca and Steven Schwartz, “abandoned their responsibilities” when they submitted the A.I.-written brief in their client’s lawsuit against the Avianca airline in March, and “then continued to stand by the fake opinions after judicial orders called their existence into question.”

    Castel ordered both LoDuca and Schwartz, along with their law firm Levidow, Levidow & Oberman, to each pay $5,000 in fines. He also ordered them to notify each judge falsely identified as the author of the bogus case rulings about the sanction.

    “The Court will not require an apology from Respondents because a compelled apology is not a sincere apology,” Castel wrote in his order in U.S. District Court in Manhattan. “Any decision to apologize is left to Respondents.””

    CNBC

  7. Wow. That’s a real slog to get through.

    I’m quite confident that most humans could write something twice as clear, three times as interesting, half as long, and with more information.

  8. @Comfortable with Real Briefs
    Yes, that happened a year and a half ago. Turns out even lawyers can be ignorant about AI and thoughtless in how they review their materials.

    Thank you @Stephen C for making it easy for me to follow these so that I can dig in deeper on the cases that interest me.

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